Why Should Norway be independent and not Brittany? Why Ireland and not Scotland? Why Nicaragua and not Québec?
As we ask ourselves thèse questions, it becomes apparent that more than language and culture, more than history and geography, even more than force or power, the foundation of the nation is will. For there is no power without will! Pierre E. Trudeau, 1965 1 . Interpreting the will of the nation is a notoriously difficult task, as leaders of the international political community are so painfully aware. One interprétation is that the nation is never fully self-aware or developed so long as it remains under the political control of another nation. What constitutes benign political control for one génération may turn out to be totally intolérable for the next: thus timing is of considérable importance in interpreting the désire of nations.
Five years ago, many predicted that the strength of Celtic nationalism was such, that dévolution, and possibly even independence for Scotland if not for Wales, would be an inévitable conséquence of the changing power structure within the United Kimgdom. Today, dévolution, not to mention independence, is a low priority in political circles and the nationalist parties are embroiled in internai disputes, ideological vacillation and postélection dépression. Yet one should not underestimate the power of nationalism, that most opportunist, chameleon-like, political theory. Nationalism, by defining the nation as the suprême political community, to whom ultimate loyalty is due, invests the nation with transcendent moral sanction and authority. The nation, thus defined, can only fully realize itself if it is freed from ail constraints upon its autonomy. Québec is in a far stronger position to realize the idéal of independence than either Scotland, Wales or a number of other ethnie homelands in Western Europe (figure 1). It has deep-seated, historié ambitions of selfgovernment nurtured by a distinctive culture and ethnie group identity. It is far richer in human and physical resources than the vast majority of actors in the international state System. It already possesses most of the institutional apparatus of a sovereign state and seems likely to accrue more power to itself in the future. Above ail it has a government elected with a clear mandate to renegotiate the terms of her future relationship with the rest of Canada. Whatever form that future may take, Québec is surely fortunate to be engaged in a political dialogue with members of a political system which are likely to honour the desires of her citizens, if it can be demonstrated that the proposed constitutional changes are the express will of the majority. Events in the rest of the world cast doubts on the ability of ethnie minorities to establish independent states in a démocratie fashion.
My aim in this paper is to look at some récent explanations for the émergence of ethnie separatism, and to apply them briefly to Québec. I shall not provide detailed commentary on the development of the separatist movement, nor on the programme of the Parti Québécois, prefering instead to highlight some of the inconsistencies and ambiguities of the explanations offered for the résurgence of politicised ethnie identity 2 .
TERRITORIAL AND ETHNIC SEPARATISM
An important analytic distinction exists between 'territorial' and 'ethnie' separatism. The former rests its case primarily on the spatial distinctiveness of the potentially independent unit. Distance, relative isolation and a perception of unfullfilled resource potential can be powerful mobilising influences in the development of a separatist movement, especially when allied to a régional distinctiveness which may encompass other variables such as language, religion or a common shared history of exploitation 3 . The history of European Imperialism abounds with cases of overseas colonies, whom having seceeded from Me- 'Ethnie' separatism, on the other hand, rests its case on the cultural distinctiveness of the community pressing for independence. Frequently, but not necessarily so, they are 'renewal movements' seeking to recover the cultural identity of a formally independent unit 5 . For nationalist leaders, imbued with the uniqueness of their destiny and contribution to the common good of world civilisation, the incorporation of their group into a multinational state is inherently contrary to nature and a severe impediment to the full réalisation of their group development potential. As Smith has demonstrated "the watchwords of ethnie separatism are identity, authenticity and diversity... it seeks through séparation the restoration of a degraded community to its rightful status and dignity, yet it also sees in the status of a separate political existence the goal of that restoration and the social embodiment of that dignity" 6 .
It follows that for independence to be achieved the primary function is to translate the goal of a separate ethnie identity into a political ideology which will animate a movement for national freedom 7 .
The remarkable feature of many contemporary separatist movements in advanced industrial states is that both types of separatism, the territorial and the ethnie, are increasingly being combined to produce 'ethno régional movements' which seek to liberate their respective peoples firmly settled in distinct, if subservient, territories 8 . Thus ethnoregionalism, defined as a species of the genus nationalism 9 , should not be confused with, nor measured in the same way as, regionalism 10 , a term which has long intrigued compétent researchers in Political Geography 11 .
THE SUBSTANCE OF SEPARATENESS
We hâve identified 'ethnicity' and 'territory' as the key 'materials' of distinctiveness. We may elaborate upon ethnie separatism, the primary concern of this article, as a powerful, if somewhat vague, sentiment. It would incorporate descent as a basis of group and of individual status, and of spiritual confirmation. We need to know to whom else we belong, ethnie separatism can thus provide a 'myth of origins' 12 . It can also provide a historié explanation for the tragic events of past conquest and subordination and a rationale for group superiority achieved through suffering, a 'myth of development' 13 . Underlying this, of course, is the question of isolation, of self-sufficiency, of the relative infrequency of sustained inter-cultural contact giving rise to ethnocentrism, a 'myth of uniqueness'.
Culture separateness reinforces the sensé of unique descent and destinable history. It opérâtes through three salient markers, the meanings of which can vary in différent social settings within the ethnie territory. The first are group customs and institutions which serve as group boudaries, as modes of exclusion and as sustainers of spécial routines and distinctive procédures. A second important variable is language, for not only is it a functional means of communication, it is also a préserver of common shared expériences and an instrument for cultural division. Often it provides the most tangible barrier to assimilation, because of its pervasive influence in societal interaction 14 . A third 'material' of culture distinctiveness is religion, a phenomenon capable both of uniting and dividing populations at a local and universal scale 15 . Table 1 that most West European states as well as Canada are experiencing serious ethnoregional challenges. We hâve outlined elsewhere the characteristics of ethnie sécession in Western Europe 16 . It was concluded that a number of factors serve to influence the likely transformation of 'régional autonomist' movements into outright 'ethnie régional movements', chief of which are the historical circumstances of the minority's incorporation into the now dominant centralised state, the tolérance of the state toward politicised ethnie sentiment, the industriousness and skill of the mobilising nationalist élite and the international dimension of ethnonationalism. Let it not be forgotten that the majority of small nation-states were created in the aftermath of continental warfare and révolutions, as in the 1840's, 1920's and 1940's. They were hardly ever purely domestic, administrative and constitutionally devolved territories. More often the résultant new states and their boundaries existed despite the daims of nationalist leaders to honour culturally defined borders to avoid ethnie conflict. Rather they conformed to the reality of super-power hegemony in Europe. Under such circumstances many political leaders faced a paradox in that the boundaries of the political unit they were to operate within, did not correspond to the boundaries of the ethnie group on whose behalf the claim of independence had been made. Europe has since witnessed a succession of cases of nationality formation attempting to make state and nation coextensive, a process I suggest which is currently being undertaken in Canada, both by the fédéral authorities, and more especially, by successive Québécois governments culminating in the élection of a party dedicated to the self-government of the 'Québécois nation', (table 1) The materials of separateness hâve to be translated into a self-conscious group identity before they can become politically useful in the drive for national independence. This process, of nationality formation, is one in which objective différences between peoples acquire subjective and symbolic significance, are transformed into group consciousness, and become the basis of political demands. There are two main stages in the development of a politicised nation. In the first stage, the thwarted intelligentsia attaches symbolic value to certain objective characteristics, créâtes a myth of group history and destiny, and attempts to communicate that myth to the defined population, especially to the socially mobilising segments.
The salience of ethnie résurgence cannot be ignored. It is évident from

Four interactive requisites are essential for the successful transformation of an objectively différent group into a subjectively conscious community: namely 1) the existence of a 'pool of symbols' of distinctiveness to draw upon;
2) an élite willing to sélect, transmit, and standardise thèse symbols for the group;
3) a socially mobilising population to whom the symbols of group identity can be transmitted; 4) the existence of one or more other groups from whom the formative group is to be differentiated (figure 2).
Of central importance is the relationship between rates of social mobilisation and assimilation of an ethnie group in relation to another, dominant or compétitive group. The leading hypothesis hère is that the conditions for the differentiation of a culturally distinct ethnie group from a rival group with which it must interact and communicate, occur when the rates of social mobilisation within the group move faster than the rates of assimilation of that group to the language and culture of its rival. Several quasi-political associations with an interest group hue seeking to préserve area's dialect and language, including the Alsacian Party of Progress.
Action pour la renaissance de la Corse, and other smaller action groups seeking régional political autonomy for the island.
Three banned, paramilitary, clandestine organizations, each with a limited following and commitment to régional political autonomy.
The Provisional wing of the Irish Republican Army, a clandestine terrorist organization seeking an end to British rule and "Protestant" domination, drawing a wider, but spasmodic following among the inhabitants than either the officiai I.R.A. or its political auxiliaries. Virtually none; however since the summer violence of 1975 and 1979 France has instituted a re-evaluation of its régional policies vis-à-vis its ethnoregional minorities.
Since 1975 they hâve gained some limited concessions, the right to teach Corsican in schools, m a promised reopening of a university, and the i appointment of Corsica's first Corsican prefect ï= since 1870. co m Virtually none, as above; however, Giscard g d'Estaing's minister of éducation in 1975 an-> nounced a programme of state subsidies for the 55 teaching of Breton. s Non-functional. N. Ireland has possessed a régional assembly since Ireland's partition; for most of the half century before its suspension it was dominated by a "Protestant" majority insensitive to the needs of the Catholic minority and overtly discriminatory. Efforts to re-establish civilian government since 1973 hâve focussed on a power-sharing committee System scheme designed to replace the former cabinet-government majority rule system with shared authority; so far, efforts to create this system hâve been thwarted by the uncompromising opposition of the Protestant community's principal linkages to the shared power concept.
", Catalonians (8 million in northeastern Spain) Esquerra Democratica and Uige-leftist-and rightist-oriented parties seeking régional political autonomy.
Very limited. Some limited cultural autonomy and February 1976 verbal récognition by Government of the region's unique identity (for first time in 40 years) promise of more dévolution to corne.
Basques (nearly 2 million in the four provinces of northern Spain and the three of southwestem France)
Euzkadi Ta Axkatasuna (ETA-"Basque Homeland and Liberty"); an outlawed, clandestine and violent irredentist group seeking a free Basque state in a "European Fédération of Races';; Enbata, a Basque association of pro-(cultural and political) autonomy groups in Basque, France, also outlawed.
Developing: after décades of neglect, and récent waves of bomb attacks and political assassinations, the Spanish state is offering a form of Home Rule to the Basques and has legaiized the use of the Basque language. It remains to be seen whether the measures will placate the demands of the "poli-milis" who hâve always insisted on independence.
(AsatMay 1979).
The second stage in nationality formation involves the articulation and acquisition of political rights for the group as a group and not on the basis of individual rights. Political demands may be articulated by an élite even before a group acquires cohésion. They may even be conceeded in the absence of group cohésion. But the clearest proof of the existence of a nationality is the achievement and maintenance of group rights through political mobilisation. This movement from communal consciousness to political action requires two preconditions:
1) a perception of inequality in the distribution of, and compétition for, the allocation of scarce resources and material rewards between groups, and 2) a political organisation to articulate group demands.
Government policies may intensify or moderate group conflicts, but the kinds of political demands made are likely to dépend more upon calculations relating to the relative power of competing élites in a political System than to the adequacy of government policies in satisfying group demands. The willingness of competing communal élites to share political power is of greater importance in maintaining the political cohésion of multinational societies than any other factor. Where that willingness is in évidence, communal conflicts can be accommodated, where it is absent, separatist demands and overt violence and civil war are to be expected.
In our discussion of nationality formation we should take due cognizance of two caveats. Firstly, it is intended that the objective markers of group identity, such as language and religion, are not 'givens' from which national identity naturally springs, they are themselves subject to variation and manipulation. Secondly, not ail symbols of group identity are of equal value in a functional sensé. Often nationalist élites tend to emphasize one symbol above ail others and strive to bring other symbols into congruence with it. Two types of structural constraints must be overcome by the nationalist movement to expand its social base. It must firstly challenge the politically established 'colonial-type' élite who controls the means of violence in the territory. Secondly, because of the constraints inhérent in a pre-industrial traditional culture, it must attack the social control of traditional institutions and their political rationalisation by alien rule. This leads the nationalist movement into its third, offensive phase, simultaneously challenging the legitimacy of the exercise of power of the state as presently constituted, and the legitimacy of the basic values underpinning indigenous traditional social structures. At times this attack on tradition in the name of modernisation and industrial development may cause ambivalence as certain portions of the native culture must be retained, and even exalted, for the sake of ethnolinguistic continuity.
The fourth and final stage of a successful nationalist movement is to create a new consensus in support of the new nation-state. As Guindon observed a décade ago, this requires, to varying degrees, "wresting the masses from the symbols of tradition, creating and celebrating a new kind of man, a product of the changing society, by initiating and controlling the formai and informai means of socialization-the schools, the public mass média, etc.-and finally, establishing a considérable degree of bureaucratie control and centralization over the whole territory to avoid the fractionalism of tribal (read ethnie) or local cultures once the political dominance of the aliens has been removed".
THE ETHNIC REVIVAL
A satisfactory understanding of contemporary ethnie separatism nécessitâtes a clear formulation of state development and of ethnie group formation. Of the interesting accounts advanced in récent years two are of particular relevance for our comparative review, namely Hechter's work on ethnoregionalism based on the central concept of Internai Colonialism 18 , and Smith's work focussing on state bureaucracy and the ethnie intelligent-sia^ discontent 19 . In 'Internai Colonialism' it was argued that ethnie solidarity among any objectively-defined set of individuals is due primarily to the existence of a hierarchical cultural division of labour which promotes reactive group formation. This cultural division of labour is typically found in régions that hâve developed as internai colonies, that is, ethnie enclaves of powerful, modemised nation-states. As capitalist exploitation, from the late eighteenth century onwards, follows ethnie cleavages and promotes cultural assimilation into the core area, industrial expansion must always be to the disadvantage of peripheral ethnie collectivities. On realising their condition, the ethnie intelligentsia must advocate separatism, if they are ever to avoid the inevitability of économie development as a perpétuai dependency of the state core région. Whilst, Hechter argues, most ethnoregional movements in Western Europe appear to hâve emerged in such régions, there are notable exceptions (among them Scotland, Catalonia and the Spanish Basque country) which necessitate a reinterpretation of the original thesis. In his more récent work a second, segmentai division of labour was identified; this leads to interactive as opposed to reactive group formation, being largely determined by the ethnie group itself.
How do thèse mechanisms explain why spécifie régions are able to maintain their ethnie identity despite modernisation and state centralisation 20 ? The crucial distinction between an hierarchical and a segmentai division of labour appears to relate to the power and vitality of the ethnoregional group's interaction with the international économie order and the residual customs and institutions which the peripheral région was allowed to maintain after its initial intégration into the developing state. As Hechter explains "the hierarchical mechanism contributing to the formation of the ethnie group is the extent to which group membership détermines individual life chances. The greater this is, the gréa-ter the psychic significance of ethnicity for the individual-and, by extension, for the group as a whole" 21 . Thus in West European peripheral régions, where individuals are not assigned to occupations solely on ascriptive criteria, ethnie identity tends to be strongest among those groups at the lower end of the stratification system. "The segmentai mechanism contributing to the formation of ethnie solidarity is the extent to which members interact wholly within the boundaries of their own group. The most critical locus of this interaction is the work site, and the best single indicator of it is the degree to which group members monopolize certain niches in the occupational structure. Occupational specialization of this kind contribute to group solidarity by establishing settings for personal contact that strengthen ties between individuals with a set of common material interests that serve to reinforce informai social ties" 22 .
If we translate thèse socio-structural characteristics into régional characteristics we find that in 'hierarchical' cases individuals avowing the importance of their culture in peripheral régions (e.g. those with distinctive language or religion such as Wales, Brittany and Corsica) are primarily found in the lower ranking positions of the régional class structure. In 'segmentai' cases, individuals adhering to the peripheral culture hâve succeeded in monopolising key occupations and maintaining a separate set of 'national' institutions. Both types of situation structure the respective interaction with the centralising Western European state. The former, where the peripheral culture remained beyond, or tangential to, the interests of the ruling élite of the state, produces a reactive response; the latter, where the peripheral culture was protected by the existence of distinctive régional institutions promûtes interactive group formation.
An alternative perspective is provided by Anthony Smith who seeks to explain the politicisation of ethnie consciousness primarily in terms of the rise of scientific bureaucracies and secular éducation 24 . Modem bureaucracies, uniike previous forms of state administration, are not only more complex, more centralised and more interventionist, but also more 'scientific', that is they incorporate into their organisations the latest techniques and methods of scientific technology. This innovation not only requires a new type of personnel as bureaucrat, but also assists the effective pénétration of the state apparatus to the farthest part of the state territory. This new kind of bureaucracy demanded a more secular, utilitarian and rational perspective and relied more on expérimental and methodical techniques. 'Rational' éducation began to displace the classical/clerical éducation and the sécularisation of society began to undermine the cosmic myths which had formed the close traditional bond between State and Church. State modernisation and its pattern of uneven development began to erode established agrarian norms and rôles, favouring the centre at the expense of the periphery and the educated intelligentsia at the expense of the landed classes 25 .
"Since the new bureaucracies, often situated in the capitals, tended to command many of the avenues to wealth and power, ambitious and qualified professionals clamoured for admission. Hence the rise of scientific bureaucracy and critical éducation spurred a whole wave of élite mobility, and paved the way for a potentially dissident stratum, and one more dangerous than any predecessor on account of their éducation and ability to organise into factions and movements" 26 .
Discontent was deepened amongst the ambitious professionals from peripheral areas and minority ethnie groups because of the many discriminatory barriers erected against them by the impérial and colonial administration which restricted coveted positions to the élite of the dominant group 27 .
As a second stage, Smith argues that increased state intervention in the présent century has produced an aggravated crisis for the thwarted intelligentsia in ex-imperial médium sized states, such as Britain and Spain, because the traditional overseas outlets for talented professionals are withering away. The effect, he daims, is worse for the ethnie élites of Scotland, Wales or Corsica, because the increased compétition in the domestic sector means they can no longer be accommodated, nor their aspirations filled. Struggling under their 'double burden' of exclusion and ambition the intelligentsia turn inwards to reach a deeper understanding of their own ethnie community. In such a milieu nationalism is embraced for it seeks to offer an historical vision of man in society, and because it is especially concerned with the formation of identity through autonomy it promises to provide a respected place for the committed intelligentsia which bureaucracy helped to create. Nationalism from this perspective is a meaning-and role-seeking movement 28 .
Government policies become the décisive déterminant as to which direction the politicized ethnoregional movement will take. Insensitive bureaucratie policies or benign neglect will tend to evoke a separatist challenge, while an accommodating system participatory approach will tend to blunt the separatists' grievances and lead to communalist options. Ultimately, of course, the success of the separatist movements in the West will be heavily influenced by the unfavourable international climate as sub-state dissolution in any one medium-sized state might herald the beginning of wider fragmentation within the international political system. QUÉBEC "I know of no national distinctions marking and continuing a more hopeless inferiority... if they prêter remaining stationary, the greater part of them must be labourers in the employ of English capitalists. In either case it would appear that the great mass of French Canadians are doomed, in some measure, to occupy an inferior position, and to be dépendent on the English for employment. The evils of poverty and dependence would merely be aggravated in a ten-fold degree, by a spirit of jealous and resentful nationality which should separate the working class of the community from the possessors of wealth and employers of labour..." Lord Durham, 1838.
How did separatism arise amongst this 'jealous and resentful nationality'? Several central problems confront us in the application of Hechter's and Smith's discussion of ethnie résurgence to the province of Québec. The first main problem is the use of Québec as the politico-spatial unit of analysis. As we shall see, nationalist leaders face the long established problem of making state and nation coterminous. The basis of Québécois separatism is a reinvigorated ethnie consciousness, or 'will' to use Trudeau's terms. But rather than undertake the dangerous and politically suicidai task of redrawing Québec's boundaries to coïncide with the ethnie majority-the francophone nation-separatist ideology attempts to convince the non-francophone minorities that the P.Q.'s conception of nationalism is territorial and state-based, consequently pluralisme and libéral. The second major problem is that no theory, when grounded in the reality of other case examples (such as the British example used by Hechter), can do more than point to the complex structural conditions which engender separatist movements. One should be wary then of asking a particular model to explain too much. The third problem is that aggregate level théories often fail to account for the significant, if at times ephemeral, quality of leading personalities, the charismatic leadership and myriad interpersonal contacts which contribue to the development of unique political cultures. Finally the interprétation of contemporary history is a notoriously difficult and humbling task, the détails of which we ail too often misrepresent in order to be theoretically consistent.
There is little doubt but that the history of Québec's post-Conquest development reveals much in the relations between Québec's English-speaking minority and French-speaking majority which supports Hechter's twin éléments of segmentation and hierarchy in his cultural division of labour 29 . By the nineteenth century French-Canadian society was essentially rural consisting of a loosely integrated System of expanding parishes 30 . Within this context a set of supra-parochial institutions gave rise to an ethnie élite composed primarily of the clergy and seigneurs who, when faced with a surplus population on a rapidly diminishing land resource base, needed "structural relief" to maintain their dominance. Guindon argues that structural relief in that milieu, could only consist in industrialisation, the very reform the traditional élite could not ensure since it was not, and had not been primarily an entrepreneurial bourgeoisie and hence lacked the requisite capital 31 .
McRoberts has recently demonstrated that during the earlier period of New France French-Canadians did in fact possess an entrepreneurial capacity based on the fur trade 32 . Their failure to accumulate capital in post-Conquest Québec was due to major structural changes within the Québec economy and to a reorientation of Canada's trade resulting from the replacement of France by Britain and the U.S.A. as the main market, thereby disadvantaging French-Canadian entrepreneurs many of whom ceased their business ventures as a resuit. Whilst successive French-Canadian économie ventures remained small and limited, English-Canadian ventures in Québec developed as a resuit of the expanded international market afforded by the Empire and the industrialisation of both Canada and her Southern neighbour.
Hierarchical structures developed relatively late in Québec, becoming marked only in the early décades of the twentieth century as a conséquence of increased inter-ethnic interaction. Large scale rural-urban migrations and industrialisation had created an occupational System where French-Canadians were disproportionately concentrated in blue collar positions and underrepresented in managerial and technical positions within the overwhelmingly Anglophone-owned enterprises. The évidence points to an established and widely recognised cultural division of labour. Yet it is a misconception to explain this situation as being a direct reflection of the value System of the two contending ethnie groups, as some hâve done. The orthodox explanation, until recently, implied a deterministic subordination of French-Canadians, to the more innovative, rational and entrepreneurial orientated English-Canadian character type 33 . As a counter-argument, two "structural" explanations are offered in the literature 34 . One concentrâtes on ethnie discrimination where English-Canadian owners hâve shown a préférence toward appointing personnel from within the Anglophone community 35 . The other stresses the rôle of language as a "sorting device" in the allocation of English and French occupations. Given the fact that until recently, few in the province were functionally bilingual, Québec Anglophones had a distinct advantage in achieving top managerial positions. It has also been shown how the language barrier might stifle not only the performance of French-Canadians, but also the capacity of Anglophone managers to recognise and promote talent 36 . Under such behavioural circumstances language discrimination need not be a conscious ploy of an ethnie élite, but an inbuilt structural mechanism reflecting the unquestioned dominance of English in the Québec business world. Added to the traditional linguistic division of labour, there has been an expansion of the provincial govemments' responsibilities with those institutions dépendent on the provincial state becoming French workplaces while the corporate sector has remained an English workplace. The expansion of the provincial public sector gave rise to new bureaucratie élites whose occupational promotion was dépendent upon their linguistic compétence. In addition the persistence of linguistically-differentiated educational institutions, the development of an aggressive and innovative French-language mass média and the expansion of provincially financed social welfare services had, by the sixties, created a comprehensive arrangement of Frenchmédium institutions. Thus "linguistic and cultural différences hâve persisted not so much because they hâve been the criteria of a cultural division of labour, although they clearly have been, but because they are embedded in a whole network of distinctly Frenchlanguage institutions which embrace much, if not ail, of the day-to-day worlds of most Québec Francophones" 37 .
Hechter's cultural division of labour is intimately connected to his inter-regional conceptualisation of core-periphery relations. By relating ethnie identity and territorial autonomism to the économie inequality of disadvantaged peripheral régions, the internai colonial theory attempts to link them to a central mechanism of international capitalism, the uneven development of régions. We may accept the opération of a cultural division of labour in Québec without necessarily accepting Québec as a dépendent periphery, and this for a number of reasons. Firstly, as the core-periphery model is essentially a régional level type of explanation, it in no way accounts for differential development amongst individuals. Thus some members of the periphery will undoubtedly gain from the extension of the core's political and commercial activity, e.g. the entrepreneurial classes and the intermediaries of régional administration and commerce, whiist other will often loose, e.g. the traditional political élite and landed classes. Similarily in the core, some may loose out as a resuit of peripheral incorporation, e.g. manual and semi-skilled workers, whose competitiveness may be undercut by cheaper labour costs in the periphery. In addition, after intégration, many in the periphery may expérience an absolute rise in their standard of living and welcome doser économie ties to the core, even though relative to the core's population they are still disadvantaged. Secondly, there are likely to be clear spatial différences between différent sub-regions of the periphery which confuse its catégorisation as either core or periphery. Thus whiist Eastern Québec remained underdeveloped, Montréal continued to be the financial center of Canada long after Ontario had emerged as the industrial center. Also a région may at the same time be both core and periphery depending upon which régions one is comparing. Whiist Québec exhibits many of Hechter's characteristic traits for a periphery in relation to Ontario, she is undoubtedly a core in her relations with the Atlantic Provinces and the West. Even if we limited the comparison to Ontario, the model is further weakened by the fact that Québec does have a provincial state government which of late has done much to erode the cultural division of labour by political means, irrespective of core interests. Hence, historically, it must be concluded that Québec's décline owes more to her géographie location, her resource underdevelopment and the relative advance of other Canadian régions, rather than to the spécifie rôle which cultural factors played in determining économie opportunity and performance. We must perforée turn to other explanations for ethnie separatism, ones which, while not denying the importance of inter-regional inequalities, do not focuss on the régional level to the exclusion of analysing the rôle of key actors in the nationalist struggle, the ethnie intelligentsia.
THE ROLE OF THE ETHNIC INTELLIGENTSIA
We may therefore accept a revised account of Hechter's cultural division of labour, without necessarily accepting its predicted relationship with the core-periphery model. However, it is possible, a priori, to assume that the grievances which arise from the occupational discrimination which underlie the cultural division of labour, will be translated into a political movement designed to redress such grievances. This in no way détermines that the résultant movement will necessarily be a separatist one as Hechter seems to imply. It could be, and in fact was in Québec, a Social Crédit Party, or a reformist Libéral Party, neither of which challenged the legitimacy of the fédéral System, merely its opération when it seemed to threaten Québécois interests. Now although feelings of disadvantage are common within the French-Canadian population, only some translate thèse grievances into a préférence for the independence option. The différences between the gênerai elec-torate and the more committed P.Q. supporters appear to dérive from différent estimâtes of the chances of improvement coming with independence. This would appear to be the touchstone of the separatist case for a better life in a future sovereign Québec 38 . It is not that nationalist ideology is a new élément in the situation. Nationalism has long been a prominent feature of Québécois politics ever since the Patriotes movement of the 1820's and 1830's. But it has always been contained within a fédéral structure, within a broad philosophy of élite accommodation. What we hâve seen in Québec of late is a reformulation of the basic principles of Québec self-determination; one in which a radical and reforming ethnie technological and bureaucratie élite hâve played a leading rôle, both in the development of a separatist ideology and in the establishment of an effective and innovative state apparatus which has become the prime instrument for séparation. Social mobilisation and state modernisation thus gave rise to a new nationalism in the sixties, which is now dominant within the Parti Québécois, and quite distinct from previous Québécois nationalism in several important respects. First, as we hâve seen, the new nationalism embraces the logic of social and économie modernisation as the key to a dynamic and prosperous Québécois future. Second, whilst traditional nationalism has been conservative and engaged in the politics of cultural defence, the new nationalism was activist and interventionist, engaged in the politics of cultural promotion. Third, where the old nationalism was content to maintain the ethnie institutional séparation, even if this meant that Anglophones had the upper hand in certain sectors, the new nationalism now sought to penetrate ail sectors developing new forms of compétition with the English. Fourth, where the old nationalism had challenged the fédéral System only when it seemed to infrige on Québec's jurisdiction-the new nationalism called into question the basis of Confédération, challenging Ottawa's right to détermine revenue levels and resource allocation. Finally, the traditional nationalism's suspicion of the state as an instrument of governance, was displaced by an ideological commitment to state intervention and planning, such that it became the key actor in the struggle for ethnie survival and the springboard for group development 42 .
From Confédération to the présent the pattern of ethnie accommodation between French and English in
We hâve argued that the ethnie bureaucratie élite played a décisive rôle in shaping Québec modernisation, but what of separatism and ethnie promotion 43 ? To many outsiders, language and cultural questions seem to hâve received a disproportionate amount of attention by former Québec governments and by the Parti Québécois. This is mainly because such observers fail to appreciate the pervasive rôle which language plays in almost ail aspects of contemporary public life, most notably in éducation, the workplace and in government 44 . Given the overriding concern to préserve the 'French fact in North America' it is not surprising that language, the essence of French distinctiveness, should be a primary political concern of the new nationalists. This concern is largely related to the fear that in time the language of the économie élite, with its associated technological specialisms, will come to dominate the language of the passive majority if the state does not intervene. In addition the trend of récent immigrants to assimilate into the Anglophone community has led to emotional assertions that in the absence of restrictive language policies only a tiny proportion of immigrants would opt for the French language instruction offered by éducation boards. Démographie forecasts of continuing déclines in the fertility levels of Francophones underpin the minority consciousness, which Camille Laurin reflects in his characterisation of the Québécois as an "endangered species" as a resuit of thèse three trends.
One explanation for the central rôle language priorities play within Québécois politics today relates to the growth of the state sector. The new middie class is overwhelmingly concentrated in the public and parapublic sector as a resuit of the intensive institution building of the sixties when the municipal civil service, health and éducation Systems required and absorbed Francophone social scientists, engineers and business graduâtes. Also to integrate into the public sector, one did not hâve to be a fluent bilingual, a requirement of the corporate, private sector. Once the state sector began to be adequately manned, language became a political issue as the aspiring middie classes, blocked in their attempts to swell the state bureaucracy, looked to the Anglophone dominated private sector for employment. Disadvantaged linguistically and experiencing blocked mobility and ethnie discrimination both in the fédéral government bureaucracy and in the private sector, the thwarted intelligentsia reinforced its détermination to seek in separatism a collective, and then political solution to its dilemma. Only in a separate, independent nation-state could the full aspirations of the Francophones be realised. Maître chez nous' was to become a fact as well as a promise.
In the event, when a nationalist government became elected on November 15, 1976 the Parti Québécois instituted many reforms and programmes which heralded the création of a national state culture based on the language of the majority-French. The ideals of the ethnie bureaucrats and académies, technologists and businessmen who constitute the government of Québec hâve been crystallised into the concept of sovereignty-association. Association with Canada is dépendent upon Québec achieving her sovereignty, and this in turn is to be determined by a référendum. But as British expérience has recently demonstrated referenda are fraught with ambiguity and invariably provide 'results' which please no particular section and antagonise most because of their indecisiveness.
Thus the issue of Sovereignty-Association, the détails of which are available in government proposais, must surely be dépendent upon the direction and strength of the separatist vote in the forthcoming référendum 45 . At root the issue revolves around the best way of measuring the démocratie will of the people of Québec, accepting of course, that the référendum is but one mechanism by which that will may be expressed. In due time it is likely that other political methods may be necessary to résolve the Canada-Québec impasse.
SEPARATISM AND DEMOCRACY
We retum in this final section to some of the contradictions inhérent in the ethnie separatist case. Many of the issues raised, albeit briefly, are fundamental to the Political Geography of state formation and deserving of more attention. The separatist case is based on the premise that ethnie majorities within a multi-ethnic policy hâve the right to constitute national govemments in their own sovereign states-the daim of national selfdetermination. Initially such daims appear to be framed in majoritarian terms and hence inherently démocratie. But on doser examination we find that there is much ambiguity in the justification for majoritarian independence. The Parti Québécois pins its hopes on a référendum mandate for the sovereignty-association option. The récent dévolution referenda in Britain should alert us to the critical question of how large a majority would be necessary in the référendum to justify the sovereignty-association proposais. In the United Kingdom a clear majority of Scots voters approved the dévolution measure. However, this was declared invalid as they did not represent the minimum required proportion of the total potential electorate (at 40%). Some might argue that given the importance of the issue in Québec, a minimum of 50% to 55% vote in favor would be too close. From the perspective of the P.Q. leadership, however, a 55% vote would mean acceptance by a "huge majority" of Francophones-somewhere around 65% 46 . The implication is that a genuine victory of the majority of Francophones would be assured. Note that in this interprétation, the majority is defined, not in terms of a collection of individuals, but by cultural groupings. "What this implies is not that the numerical majority ought to ruie, but that the majority of the majority culture, should ruie; which is as much as to daim a right to ruie on behalf of a certain group within society, not simply by virtue of its being the majority, but by virtue of its cultural characteristics, or its substantive way of life" 47 .
Although it is framed as an exercise in democracy, the forthcoming référendum has been critieized on the grounds that only citizens résident in Québec are eligible to vote. Opponents argue, as they did in the U.K., that if it is such a major constitutional proposai, then surely the voice of the country as a whole should be heard and not just those in the part which is culturally différent. Separatism has implications far beyond the borders of Québec. The retort, of course, is that the basis of the separatist daim is a cultural one, in the only political unit in which the French are a majority. The rest of Canada is hardly likely to vote for its own dismemberment! Further it is argued that it is the spécial responsibility of the Québec state to represent the interests, not simply of individuals per se, but of the French culture; the corollary of this is that it is the French nation which has the right to separate if it so chooses. Now this is a right which is claimed, irrespective of majoritarian status, for if we change the scale of the context and look at Canada as a whole, the culture which is said to hâve the right is clearly a minority one. It is the political context which détermines majority-minority rights, a separate issue altogether from the collective daims to independence as a right per se. The emphasis on the appropriate political context provides further illustration of the tensions inhérent in the separatist idéal. In the past the P.Q. leadership, Camille Laurin in particular, hâve pressed the daim of the Francophone nation to independence because it is the only nation in Québec (implying that only territorially defined majorities hâve rights to constitute nations); other ethnie groups hâve a responsibility to participate and cooperate to develop the national culture of Québec 48 . However, the Minister also uses the term nation in a way which is synonymous with the state, and not the ethnie. Separatist rhetoric refers to Québec as a nation struggling for political independence. In order to do so this argument must maintain that the Québec state represents not only the embodiment of the French nation (as used to be argued), but of ail the people within it. In other words, the "national culture" of Québec, though decidedly French, is the common property of ail its citizens. The extension of this nationalist doctrine is that the state, primarily responsible for the promotion of national culture, has the responsibility to ensure that every citizen learn the single officiai language. Thus the preamble of the original version of the Language Charter declared that "the French language has always been the language of the Québec people, that it is, indeed, the very instrument by which they hâve articulated their identity" 49 . To maintain this identity throughout the province the language was to be used as an instrument of French cultural promotion. Québec's nonfrancophone population saw in this formulation the establishment of an officiai state culture, with the implication that they would become disadvantaged citizens even within their own province. Recognising this fear and in the light of substantial criticism of its earlier drafts, the preamble to the new bill (Bill 101) was modified, referring to French as "the distinctive language of a people that is in the majority French-speaking the instrument by which that people has articulated its identity". Yet as Knopff maintains this awkward reformulation does not remove the inhérent ambiguity which gave rise to the légal enforcement of French culture in Québec, that is "that the nationalist position, when pushed to its logical extremity, leads to difficulties which force the nationalists to embrace a majoritarianism which itself entails an abandonment of the fundamental premise of nationalism, namely that nations and states should be coextensive".
The dilemma facing the Parti Québécois is that the rationale for the separatist drive is 'ethnie nationalism'. But rather than re-draw Québec's boundaries to coincide with the Francophone nation (to possibly incorporate irredentist minorities in Madawaska, Acadia, North-Eastern Ontario and parts of the U.S.A.) the Parti Québécois prefers to avoid the dilemma by referring to the Québécois nation's right to self-government, thereby converting an ethnie nationalism to a territorial nationalism. It hopes to persuade non-francophones that its conception of nationalism is territorial and state-based, one in which they make partake if they choose to exercise their right to assimilate into the dominant national culture'. Indeed participation will be encouraged, as the Parti Québécois is anxious to portray its government as a government for ail in the province regardless of ethnie origin. Now this tension between 'ethnie' and 'territorial' nationalism is a common characteristic of separatist movements. The Biafran secessionist attempt failed in large part to convince the non-lbo minority groups within Biafra that Ibo ethnie nationalism was but the spearhead of a larger Eastern Région territorial nationalism. Similarly the failure of Plaid Cymru to significantly extend its électoral base out from the Welsh-speaking western heartland is due in the main to their failure to convince the 70% non-Welsh-speakers that their nationalism is at least as territorially motivated as it is culturally motivated !i0 . If the Parti Québécois can arrive at a programme of action which can reconcile both ethnie and territorial-state nationalism, then the separatist option of Sovereignty-Association will be both more démocratie and more likely to provide a surer foundation for an independent Québec. For, recall that nations are formed and not given.
CONCLUSION
In this paper we hâve argued that the uneven spatial impact of modernisation, coupied with the cultural division of labour are important structural components of the development of ethnie relations in Québec. However, the rôle of the thwarted ethnie intelligentsia was considered to be crucial in explaining the timing and the political character of the résultant separatist movement which culminated in the government of the Parti Québécois. It remains to be seen to what extent the idéal of independence, cherished by a section of the Québécois élite, will be endorsed by the gênerai population of this most distinctive of Canadian provinces.
NOTES
